Discussion about Russian Infantry Doctrine
 

Hey guys, I figured you all might be interested in this discussion I started on Military History Online(MHO) about Russian Infantry doctrine and if it at all changed during the war. It's pretty good, and was the learning experience for me. I hope you guys enjoy it.
http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com...mID=11&ID=8682

From Kursk on-, the strategic level doctrine for the Soviets was the offensive. It was ingrained into their minds. This did not change through the remainder of the war. They learned to become very good at “force concentration” & their own brand of “Blitzkrieg.”

Although in spite of lend-lease equipment from the U.S., the typical Russian infantry company lacked the proper logistics that Western Allies & even their German enemy enjoyed & their localized tactics remained basically the same- pour men into the meat-grinder & overwhelm the enemy.

They learned the value of a strategic reserve & had the ability to maintain one throughout the war.

The Soviets used Calvary more effectively than any other nation during WW2. It operated as an independent organization within the Soviet Army. It acted as support for infantry & armored units on the operational level in later war years.

Infantry unit composition changed somewhat through the years, but not drastically.

How did tactics/strategy play into this, from the very top to the company level since they used force concentration?


So even though we gave them ample amounts of Studebakers(I don't know much about what we gave the Russians besides Studs and Shermans)?

How did these work? Are they like a Russian version of a Kamphgruppe?

What kind of support roles exactly?

I'm still learning about the war, so please don't mind me asking any questions that you have probably already answered billions of times:salute[1]:

The Soviet Air Force was almost completely dependant on U.S. high octane aviation fuel. Also, they produced less than 1000 locomotives during the war, so the U.S. locomotives were also very helpful. But probably the most important lend/lease items were the 375,000 2 1/2 ton Dodge and Studebaker trucks. While the Germans still used mostly horses to pull artillery late in the war, the Soviets used trucks to move ammo, arty, men, and supplies, making them much more mobile than the Germans.

Ameican lend/lease supplies to the Soviet Union:

Aircraft 14,795
Tanks 7,056
Jeeps 51,503
Trucks 375,883
Motorcycles 35,170
Tractors 8,071
Guns 8,218
Machine guns 131,633
Explosives 345,735 tons
Building equipment valued $10,910,000
Railroad freight cars 11,155
Locomotives 1,981
Cargo ships 90
Submarine hunters 105
Torpedo boats 197
Ship engines 7,784
Food supplies 4,478,000 tons
Machines and equipment $1,078,965,000
Non-ferrous metals 802,000 tons
Petroleum products 2,670,000 tons
Chemicals 842,000 tons
Cotton 106,893,000 tons
Leather 49,860 tons
Tires 3,786,000
Army boots 15,417,001 pairs

kawaiku-

I'm by no means an authority on the Soviet Army, so I can only answer your questions to the best of my knowledge. Don't take it as gospel though.

On the Corps level, from about the end of 42' to the beginning of 43', changes in the Soviet Army were happening. Anti-tank brigades were being disbanded, tank brigades were formed, mechanized divisions were formed, but basic platoon level infantry composition stayed the same-with the exception that more smg's were issued per squad in 44' & especially 45'.

Infantry field tactics suffered early in the war due to the lack of veteran field officers. This was because of the Officer Corps Purges of 39' & this situation only improved somewhat in later years. Initiative & morale certainly improved & impacted performance, due to changes STAVKA allowed to happen, such as allowing soldiers access to the Orthodox churches, awarding medals for "individual" performance, establishing the Gaurds units- a symbol of attaining "elite" status, and the return of lesser ranks.

The Soviets to their credit, were not complete idiots. Yes, they did have a huge superiority in numbers, but they appeared to have overwhelming strength in local attacks due to their ability to prod & probe then attack on a narrow front, concentrating all their forces through a single point. This was often times done at 2 single points in an effort to create a pincer movement. The preconditions for this type of doctrine called for:

1. Deception
2. Support
3. Mobility
4. Numerical superiority

After reconing an area, they would pound the Hell out of a narrow stretch with artillery. Next, armored & mechanized brigades would pour through with tank riders, followed by rifle battalions to take care of by-passed German strong points.

I'm talking about logistics-not material. Yes, the Soviets enjoyed much from our LL program & from what their own factories were producing later in the war, but they often lacked the proper training to service this equipment or utilize it effectively to the degree they should have-or at least as well as Germany or the Western Allies.

No, not a Kampfgruppe. I believe Russian forces were pulled out by division strength to be R&R'd. Gaurds units took 1st preference.

Lots of different roles. Diversions, screens for infantry, flank attacks, moving supplies & weapons. Their mobility alone served them well, considering some of the terrain types Russia has, the winter weather & the sheer size of the country.

Wow Soldier. Where did you find those numbers? Now, is that over-all and is it possible to see, by any chance, how these played out throughout the years?

Kawaiku, IMHO the three most important things we gave the Russians during WWII were as follows -

#1 - Radios. The Russians were decades behind the rest of the world in the manufacturing of the intricate parts and components such as tubes. They would of been in serious Trouble indeed if it were not for us supplying them with Radios of all types.

#2 - Waterproof Radio & Telephone Wire. The Russians couldnt manufacture wire to any degree of compitance. All the stuff they made always had a leak or a break in it somewhere. I read a quote somewhere that a Russian General, I cant remember his name, once said that this was the single greatest piece of aid that the USA sent them during the war.

#3 - High Octane Aviation Fuel, and the technology to produce it. Once the Russsian Fighters started getting this fuel, the preformance of their planes vastly improved and was quite a shock to the Luftwaffe.

Hey Kawaiku, check out this thread on lend lease numbers i posted a while ago. The numbers will floor you. BTW, we gave the Russians $11,260,343,603.02

http://kampfgruppe.us/showthread.php?t=4674

That's alright, and as for gospel... that would be kinda awkward in my own weird way, buuut I will take in your answers and hopefully (when I get the chance) to use them as a basis for any further research and anything of the like.

For the non-Bold Part: What do you mean exactly by the STAVKA allowing changes to happen. Was it more of a hands off approach or did they take part in it directly?

In the Bold part: I think that this really showed in the build up to Operation Uranus which is funny because the Germans thought that the Russians never had the capability but found that out in the winter counteroffensive of '41.

I never really heard of these Schreck. These are a bunch of firsts.
Question. How did the high octane aviation fuel improve the performance of the Russian planes?

And WOOOOW about that link. That's crazy. Although I'm not quite sure why we sent stuff to the countries in South America. That is a lot of stuff.